RETHINKING THE CANONS OF ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
The canons of Islamic intellectual history have changed quite There are a number of reasons for such shifts in posthumous reputation. The renewed prominence of Ibn Taymiyya, for example, surely has something to do with the noticeable rise of Salafism in the Sunni world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Interest in Averroes has tended to be especially keen in modernist Arab circles in which he is often seen as a tragic hero whose rationalist and philosophic outlook was for long submerged by religious obscurantism. The fact that his works were translated into Latin and exerted a profound influence on the Latin philosophical tradition has also been an understandable source of pride for Arab intellectuals writing under the shadow of western political, economic and technological ascendancy. By contrast, Taftāzānī and Sanūsī have not found comparable modern advocates. Rather, their philosophically-and logically-informed brand of Ashʿari theology fell out of fashion in the modern period, giving way to a renewed interest in either the supposedly more "rationalist" outlook of the Muslim philosophers and Muʿtazili theologians or the supposedly more "Islamic" approach of the Hanbalis. The scholastic prose of Sanūsī and Taftāzānī also fails to appeal to many modern readers: it is compressed, analytic, densely argumentative, and presupposes familiarity with a range of instrumental sciences such as logic, rhetoric and jurisprudence. Furthermore, the fact that they adopted the typical scholastic literary forms of compressed handbook, commentary and gloss for their writings has also not endeared them to modern observers who-mistakenly as it were -often assume that such literary forms are inherently unoriginal or pedantic. A final obstacle is that the works of Sanūsī and Taftāzānī are often not available in reliable and easily accessible editions. The best editions of their major works are more than a century old. The few editions that have appeared in recent years are often unreliable and betray the editors' lack of familiarity with the thought and technical terminology of the authors: punctuation and paragraphing is often arbitrary and confusing; explicatory footnotes are often unhelpful and irrelevant.
1 The editions produced in Istanbul and Cairo in the late nineteenth century are far superior, despite lacking the paraphernalia of modern editions.
Typesetters and proofreaders of that time clearly had an intimate knowledge of these texts, a knowledge that is now lamentably scarce. But these older editions are rare and difficult to use for 1 modern readers, lacking as they do punctuation, paragraphing and explanatory footnotes.
A lot of attention has been given in recent decades to the question Islam", and that the Islamic intellectual tradition stagnated in later centuries due to ijtihād being proscribed or curtailed, is not simply an orientalist construction, as is often believed, but seems rather to It is of course an illusion to think that we can give equal attention to each and every author whose works have come down to us.
Selectivity is inevitable in any coverage of Islamic intellectual history, and this selectivity arguably cannot but reflect modern concerns and tastes. To quote the Italian author Italo Svevo, writing approximately a century ago:
The past is always new; as life proceeds it changes, because parts of it that may have once seemed to have sunk into oblivion rise to the surface and others vanish without a trace because they have come to have such slight importance. The present conducts the past in the way a conductor conducts an orchestra. It wants these particular sounds, or thoseand no others. That explains why the past may at times seem very long and at times very short … The only part of it that is highlighted is the part that has been summoned up to illumine, and to distract us from, the present.
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There is surely some truth to this. Nevertheless, I would want to argue that as academic historians we should not simply succumb to the unreflective, present-centered selectivity that Svevo so eloquently evokes. I shall offer two reasons, the first more philosophical, and the second more historical.
Philosophically, one might object to the idea that we in the present stand with the past in full view and then pick and choose various parts of it that we happen to find congenial or interesting. This radically voluntarist model-which seems to derive from Nietzsche-is surely one-sided. It ignores the fact that the direction of influence goes the other way too: that the past influences and forms the present, and that it is impossible for us to free ourselves at will from that influence and face the past as a conductor faces his or her orchestra. This is a point that has been stressed in our time by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Alasdair MacIntyre. Both philosophers have emphasized that our present perspective is grounded in our history, by a tradition in which we stand whether we know it or not-ʿarafta am lam taʿrifi, to adapt a well-known expression from the mystical poet Ibn al-Fāriḍ. Another example is from the field of Islamic theology (kalām). At least since Gardet and Anawati's learned Introduction à la théologie musulmane, 11 a widespread assumption amongst western specialists has been that the discipline of kalām is basically a defensive or apologetic discipline. In medieval Europe, theology was the queen of the sciences and pursued for its own sake as a way of deepening the believer's understanding of the "mysteries" of the Christian faith.
By contrast, in the Islamic world-or so it is often claimed-kalām was never as highly regarded as the discipline of Islamic law (fiqh) and had legitimacy only insofar as it might be helpful to defend a creed that was already known via revelation against the arguments of heretics and unbelievers. This supposed purpose of kalām has even been enshrined in the widely used translation "dialectical
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Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭashköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda wa miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī maqḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Ḥadītha, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 95 (on the definition and impermissibility of tafsīr bi-lra'i), 116 (on the excellence of Rāzī's commentary).
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theology." As a description of attitudes in contemporary Sunni
Islam, such a generalization may not be too far from the mark.
But as a historical statement, it is far from adequate. In the muchmaligned period from 1250 to 1850, the prevalent attitude was very different. When one looks at the works of Taftāzānī and Sanūsī one encounters the view that kalām is the most important of the religious sciences; that kalām-by contrast to Islamic law-demands demonstrative certainty, not mere dialectical preponderance; and that religious faith based on knowledge of the rational proofs of kalām is inherently superior to religious faith by imitation of elders and peers (taqlīd). Sanūsī was even inclined to the radical view that a nominal Muslim who unreflectively accepts the articles of faith and has no knowledge of their rational proofs is not a Muslim in the eyes of God and will be damned on the Day of Judgment.
12 And to repeat, Sanūsī was by no means a marginal or maverick figure: His works were studied throughout Islamic Africa (and even beyond)
for centuries and still dominated the teaching of theology at the Azhar when Muḥammad ʿAbduh was a student. In other words, it turns out that the view that kalām is of marginal importance; that its purpose is purely apologetic; that it is essentially dialectical; etc.
is based on a highly selective reading of Islamic intellectual history that unwittingly elides traditions and figures that until around 1900
were still of central importance. 19 Neither work has received much attention from modern scholars.
In recent years, the argument has been made that in Islamic civilization philosophy was never adopted into the curricula of the is in my view a most unfortunate attitude. Specialists in European history can perhaps afford to feel that "philology" is passé-after all, they can rely on the monumental efforts of nineteenth-and early twentieth century philological scholarship and the plethora of excellent editions that this scholarship has generated. We in the field of Arabic and Islamic studies can hardly afford to adopt this attitude when we know so little about literary, religious, theological, philosophical and scientific currents in the post-Mongol period.
There is surely no alternative to careful, historically sensitive work with manuscripts and rare prints if the aim is to recover large parts of Islamic intellectual and literary history, thus helping to rethink and 
